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Abstract 
Although a sizeable body of research now exists in epistemic cognition, it tends to stand 
apart from other aspects of cognition and cognitive development.  Here it is proposed to 
situate epistemic cognition in a context of its roots and development as a dimension of 
cognitive development more generally. The present paper draws a strong continuous link 
between the earliest understanding of other minds, examined under the Theory of Mind, 
and the tasks that confront adults throughout the lifespan – that of interpreting evidence 
and coordinating it with what they already take to be true. The primary focus is the How 
question of knowledge change. To gain insight into this question, it is proposed to focus 
on epistemic activity in action. It is suggested here that the standards for knowledge 
formation and revision, which are closely connected with epistemic understanding of 
theory-evidence coordination, change developmentally. Another major change proposed 
is that the process increasingly comes under conscious control. 
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How do people know? How do people form beliefs? How do people revise beliefs? Are there 
developmental differences in this regard? These questions have long been a concern of psychologists, 
philosophers and educators. Their answers can be found in writing on the topic of epistemic cognition 
(Bendixen & Rule, 2004; Greene, Muis, & Pieschl, 2010; Greene, Sandoval, & Bråten, 2016; Muis, 
Bendixen, & Haerle, 2006; Perry, 1970). Following Chinn, Buckland, and Samarapungaran (2011) and 
Greene et al. (2016), epistemic cognition is defined here as “cognition of or relating to knowledge” (Greene 
et al., 2016, p. 3). Although a sizeable body of research now exists under this heading, it tends to stand apart, 
with few connections to other aspects of cognition and cognitive development.  Here I propose a broader 
view, situating epistemic cognition in a context of its roots and development as a dimension of cognition and 
cognitive development more generally. My primary focus is on the mechanism question, the ‘How’ question 
of knowledge change. I propose that this change only comes about through application of one's epistemic 
cognition in practice, which consists of forming and revising claims. This is a continuous process through 
life and there is reason to think that the nature of the process changes, with mechanisms and standards for 
knowledge formation and revision changing developmentally. A major change, I propose, is that the process 
increasingly comes under conscious control. To gain insight into the how question of knowledge change, I 
propose focusing on epistemic activity in action – the application of epistemic cognition.  
Available models of the developmental progression of epistemic cognition offer a very general 
stage-like description of this progression with little attention to mechanism. They began with Perry’s (1970) 
study of Harvard undergraduate students, hardly a broad sample of the population. For many years, research 
following Perry’s work continued the study of adolescent and adult samples, with no reference to the 
developmental origins of their thought. An assumption that epistemic beliefs emerge abruptly in adolescence 
and remain unchanged thereafter – a non-developmental account – seems unwarranted, considering the 
cognitive development that occurs along so many other dimensions during the years between early childhood 
and adolescence. Researchers are thus left with few answers to the key questions of how epistemic 
conceptions emerge and how they continue to develop. Although researchers have gone on to address many 
other important questions, such as how epistemic cognition is related to academic performance (Muis, 
Kendeou, Franko, 2011; Stømsø, Bråten, & Britt, 2011), little work has been done to further our 
understanding of its development. Largely standing today is the 2004 conclusion drawn by Bendixen and 
Rule, “Currently there is neither a unified model of epistemological understanding to guide research, nor a 
single model that clearly articulates the relationship between personal epistemology and how epistemological 
beliefs change and develop” (p. 69). A fuller developmental account is essential not only for expanding 
understanding at a theoretical level but also for its educational implications, by identifying means to support 
development of sophisticated epistemic cognition.   
It is not the case that little is known about cognitive development in the first decade of life, and more 
specifically development potentially relevant to epistemic cognition. In particular, there is now an extensive 
literature, particularly in the field of developmental psychology, on children’s theory of mind (ToM), 
addressed to how young children understand their own and others’ minds. However, like epistemic cognition 
research, ToM research has been confined to a particular age range – in the case of ToM the first years of life 
− with very little work addressed to older children. Research on older children’s higher-order ToM tends to 
have an atheoretical quality, placing more emphasis on the application of second-order understanding and 
how it affects other aspects of development rather than on the development of a comprehensive theory 
addressing issues such as how change occurs (Miller, 2012). In understanding developing knowledge about 
knowing, then, there exists a conspicuous gap consisting of the decade between early childhood and 
adolescence. My aim is to fill this gap by identifying a continuous development and in doing so to examine 
the nature of the process of change. 
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2. A model of development of epistemic cognition: What develops? 
Drawing on Chinn’s et al. (2011) model of Epistemic Cognition, I propose that the epistemic 
standards that individuals employ change developmentally. Epistemic processes refer to strategies and other 
activities by which one can achieve knowledge. Epistemic standards refer to the standards used to evaluate 
knowledge claims (Chinn et al., 2011). The literature on epistemic cognition has focused on examining 
people's beliefs about knowledge and knowing – known as their epistemic beliefs (Greene et al., 2016; 
Kitchener, 2002). The model proposed here extends the literature significantly by proposing the examination 
of application of people’s epistemic beliefs (epistemic activity in action), rather than focusing on epistemic 
beliefs themselves. Agreeing with Sandoval (2005) that students’ beliefs about their own knowing may differ 
from their beliefs about scientists’ knowing, I extend this idea by proposing that the application of students’ 
epistemic beliefs in practice may differ from their epistemic beliefs. I further advocate that the distance 
between epistemic activity in action and epistemic cognition decreases as one acquires increasing awareness 
and control of each. Given the focus of the present work on epistemic activity in action, the development of 
epistemic standards is a focus, although it is acknowledged that other components of epistemic cognition 
(i.e., epistemic processes, values) also develop and interact with epistemic standards (Clement et al., 2015). 
Insights from research in ToM, testimony and argumentation contribute to  addressing the question of what 
develops in the epistemic realm and supports knowledge change.    
2.1. Epistemic standards change developmentally 
2.1.1. Epistemic standards in early childhood 
The origins of epistemic cognition are identifiable in the early childhood achievements examined 
under the theory-of-mind literature (Kuhn, Cheney & Weinstock, 2000). Even young children form and 
revise beliefs. They are just not aware of doing so. For example, preschoolers have the tendency to report 
they have always known information they have just learned (Taylor, Esbensen & Bennett, 1994). What 
influences young children to adopt and revise beliefs?	  A growing literature on testimony provides insights 
regarding young children’s standards in judging the credibility of the source of new information. Standards 
that young children employ include an informant’s expertise, age, power, group membership and relationship 
with the child, with children showing preference for informants who are experts in the domain that the 
information is related to, to older informants, to authority figures and to those who have close familiarity 
with or belong to the same group (Harris & Carriveau, 2011; Mills, 2013). For example, children prefer to 
seek and endorse information from native-accented speakers (Kinzler, Corriveau & Harris, 2011). Other 
epistemic standards employed by young children include an informant’s record of accuracy (Harris & 
Carriveau, 2011) and an informant’s confidence about their knowledge (Jaswal & Malone, 2007).  
Research examining young children’s reasoning with peers also offers insights regarding standards 
that young children employ in modifying their beliefs. This line of research shows that even three-year-olds 
use evidence (e.g., this is ice) to justify their claims (Kӧymen, Rosenbaum & Tomasello, 2014). Notably, 
research shows that young children’s standards change with age. Remarkable differences have been reported 
between the age of three and four. While three-year-olds show preference for egocentric standards, such as 
familiarity with the informant (Corriveau, Harris, et al., 2009), four-year-olds prefer more objective and 
more germane standards, such as the informant’s history of reliability. For example, four-year-olds show 
preference toward informers who have been reliable in their past performance, even when they have to reject 
familiar individuals who weren’t reliable in recent judgments in favour of reliable strangers (Corriveau & 
Harris, 2009). Children by the age of four show greater sensitivity to the number and kind of errors made by 
an informant (Mills, 2013) and are able to distinguish experts based on their domain of expertise, showing 
preference for one expert over another depending on the issue they are dealing with and experts’ domain of 
expertise, compared to three-year-olds (Koenig & Jaswal, 2011; Sobel & Corriveau, 2010). For example, 
when children were presented with a new dog, they preferred to ask the dog expert rather than a novice about 
the name of the dog (Koenig & Jaswal, 2011). Furthermore, five-year-olds show better understanding of how 
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relevant facts can be used to affect knowledge change in others, as evidenced by the production of more 
justifications in their dialogues. Importantly, they are also more open to changing their knowledge than 
three-year-olds (Kӧymen, Rosenbaum & Tomasello, 2014).  
This change during the third to fourth year of life takes place at the same time as major 
developmental milestones are observed in children’s cognitive development, as manifested in their 
achievements in the false belief task. This co-incidence supports the more general position proposed here 
that development of epistemic cognition should be situated in cognitive development more generally.   
2.1.2. Epistemic standards in middle childhood 
The epistemic standards employed by elementary-school children remain predominantly egocentric. 
Barzilai and Zohar (2012), examining via think-alouds how elementary school students judged the 
trustworthiness of websites, found that the predominant epistemic standard employed was personal authority 
– asking, for example, their Mom. More objective and rigorous epistemic standards, such as website author’s 
expertise, scientific evidence or author biases were very rarely employed. Yet, during elementary school 
years, there is a developing appreciation of the epistemic standard of judging epistemic products (e.g., 
arguments, models) on the basis of their fit to evidence. Pluta, Chinn, and Duncan (2011) asked elementary 
school students to generate a list of criteria to evaluate scientific models and found that a quarter reported 
criteria relating to model fit with evidence (although other criteria were more commonly reported). Although 
elementary-school students show a developing appreciation for data to support their claims, they show 
preference for data from their own knowledge or experience rather than more objective scientific evidence 
(Amsel & Brock, 1996; Anderson, Chinn, Change, Waggoner, & Yi, 1997; Kuhn & Moore, 2015). Kuhn and 
Moore (2015) examined how elementary-school students used evidence in their dialogues to convince their 
peers to change beliefs about a social science and a physical science topic. They found that, even though a 
list of relevant shared evidence was available, about 90% of the evidence that students employed came from 
their personal knowledge and experience. Similar results were observed in research examining how 
elementary-school students deal with evidence that disconfirms their prior beliefs. Amsel and Brock (1996) 
examined children’s behaviour when, in their experimentation, they encountered findings that contradicted 
their prior beliefs; they found that children in elementary childhood failed to use the new evidence to change 
their beliefs. Students typically are biased in evaluating evidence; they tend to ignore evidence that 
contradicts their knowledge or distort evidence to fit their existing theories (Chinn & Brewer, 1993). Much 
of the research on scientific reasoning reports similar results (Lehrer & Schauble, 2015; Sandoval, Sodian, 
Koerber, & Wong, 2014). 
2.1.3. Epistemic standards in adolescence 
In adolescence, attention to objective data increases, although data based on personal knowledge 
remains a more predominant epistemic standard. Subjective epistemic standards, such as agreement with 
one’s own knowledge, are predominant in adolescents’ judgments about the trustworthiness of sources 
(Mason, Boldrin, & Ariasi, 2010) and about the veracity of knowledge claims (Mason, Ariasi, & Boldrin, 
2011). Iordanou and Constantinou (2015) examined how 15- and 16-year-olds argue with peers who hold 
opposing views on a socio-scientific issue, in a knowledge-rich learning environment. Participants’ dialogue 
transcripts were analyzed in terms of the overall use of evidence, the amount of evidence per argument and 
per counterargument, the function of evidence use and the accuracy of the evidence employed. Only a 
quarter of adolescents’ dialogue units contained evidence. Adolescents employed evidence most of the time 
to support their own position rather than to weaken the opposing position. In terms of the epistemic standards 
employed, these older adolescents, like middle-school students (Kuhn & Moore, 2015), used undocumented 
evidence claims from personal knowledge to support their claims. Eighty percent of adolescents’ dialogue 
units made claims based on personal knowledge.  
Besides limited use of evidence in argument production, limited employment of rigorous epistemic 
standards regarding evidence-claim coordination has been documented during argument evaluation.  
Iordanou, Muis and Kendeou (2014) examined, using the think-aloud methodology, the processes that 
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adolescents engage in when reading a text, focusing particularly on on-line processing of evidence. 
Adolescents rarely judged the credibility of evidence using epistemic standards such as the number of 
empirical studies which support a particular finding, the methodology used to produce a finding (e.g. 
whether the scientific method was used) or the fit of a claim to evidence.  
2.1.4. Epistemic standards in adulthood 
The growing literature examining college students’ judgments of trustworthiness of different 
information sources provides some insight regarding adults’ epistemic standards. Adults show the ability to 
evaluate experts from different disciplines (e.g. biologist, chemist, earth scientist), by estimating the extent to 
which they might possess relevant knowledge about a specific science topic (Bromme & Thomm, 2015) – an 
ability not shown by young children. Undergraduate students consider official documents as more credible 
sources of information than newspapers (Bråten, Strømsø & Salmerón, 2011). However, they place 
unwarranted faith in textbooks (Wineburg, 1991).  
Examining undergraduate students’ dialogues with peers to gain insight into their epistemic activity 
in action, Iordanou and Constantinou (2014) have observed that even adults do not employ evidence 
consistently to support their claims. In Iordanou and Constantinou (2014) study, adults’ percentage of usage 
of evidence which functioned to support their claims was only 25% and the percentage of usage of evidence 
which functioned to weaken other’s claims was even less − 18%. Kuhn (2016) in an effort to gain a better 
understanding of the factors underlying the limited use of evidence in argumentation, examined whether 
individuals’ limitations in conceptions of both evidence and causality may constrain their potential to employ 
evidence in argumentation. In that study, adults were presented with a scenario and were asked to choose 
among three options the one that could serve as the strongest evidence against an opponent’s claim. Findings 
show that half of the adult participants chose the option which included no evidence and simply made a 
contrasting causal assertion, showing limitations in appreciation and application of epistemic standards 
pertaining to evidence-claim coordination, even in adulthood. Similarly, Kuhn et al. (2000) found that only 
half of a group of adults consisting of undergraduate students, college students and professionals reached an 
evaluativist way of thinking, that is an understanding that knowledge evolves through coordination of theory 
with data. The only exception was the group of experts − all of whom exhibited an evaluativist mode of 
thinking. 
Limitations in reasoning about evidence have been observed not only in laypersons’ reasoning but 
also in scientists’ reasoning, such as confirmation bias in interpreting evidence in order to provide support to 
favourite theories. Yet, despite these limitations, experts’ epistemic standards are more in line with the 
rigorous standards employed in formal science. Scientists employ rigorous epistemic standards and practices 
(e.g., peer review, statistics), while they also reflect and revise those standards that make the distinction of 
the strongest theories at a particular time and the growth of knowledge possible (Chinn & Buckland, 2012). 
Self-reflection on the way of knowing and the standards that one employs is according to Habermas the most 
comprehensive way of knowing, and one of the highest criteria employed by doctoral examiners to judge 
thesis quality, compared to either the empirical-analytical way of knowing which places emphasis on facts, 
the objective elements of knowing, or the historical-hermeneutic way of knowing which stresses 
interpretation, the more subjective elements of knowing (Clement et al., 2015). 
2.2. Epistemic understanding of evidence and theory-evidence coordination both develop 
Underlying age changes observed in epistemic standards is changing epistemic understanding 
regarding evidence and its coordination with theory, which also undergoes development. Three-year-olds 
make highly subjective judgments (Wildenger, Hofer & Burr, 2010) and attribute thinking as reflection of 
external reality. One of the landmarks in this developmental progression of epistemic understanding of 
evidence and evidence-theory coordination is the understanding that evidence is different from a claim, 
which is reflected in pre-schoolers’ success in the False Belief task by the age of four (Perner & Davies, 
1991). This success reflects understanding that different information leads to different beliefs. This 
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understanding also entails the understanding that evidence is different from information; information only 
becomes evidence in relation to a claim.  
 
During middle childhood, the understanding that one piece of evidence is amenable to different 
interpretations is achieved (Lalonde & Chandler, 2002). The understanding that different individuals can 
assign different meanings to the same stimulus (Carpendale & Chandler, 1996) reflects achievement of more 
mature understanding than earlier success in ToM tasks, since it involves an understanding that different 
beliefs could result from the same input, not different inputs. In other words, middle-school children realize 
not only that people can form different beliefs when they have access to different information, as was the 
case with ToM tasks, but also when they have access to the same information. Middle school students 
showed also a better understanding of evidence, reflected in their ability to distinguish between causes and 
reasons, than pre-schoolers. Astington, Pelletier and Homer (2002) found that seven-year-olds exhibited 
better ability in distinguishing between the cause of a situation and a person’s reason for believing it than 
pre-schoolers; this ability was related with second-order false-belief understanding, that is, their awareness 
that people have beliefs about the content of others’ minds. Yet, understanding of human knowing is not yet 
fully developed, as it is not applied consistently nor with appropriate justification (Eisbach, 2004). Also, 
even though middle-school children are able to understand multiple interpretations of simple stimuli, which 
offer clear-cut dual interpretations, such as ambiguous pictures (Lalonde & Chandler, 2002), nonetheless, 
when explicitly asked to respond to stimuli that do not offer any facilitative, perceptual cues of the existence 
of alternative interpretation, as is the case in most real-life situations, they are not able to do so. Sandoval 
and Millwood (2005), examining high school students’ written explanations for problems on natural 
selection, found that adolescents made noninterpretive references to data (e.g., the graph shows X).  This 
finding suggests that even high school students believe that “claims are not distinct from data but are 
somehow embodied in them, that a particular graph or table or other inscription directly represents some 
aspect of the natural world and consequently has but one meaning” (p. 49, Sandoval & Millwood, 2005).  
Children’s limited understanding of the fact that physical or other phenomena are not self-explanatory, but 
rather are amenable to different interpretations, is also reflected in their preference for direct observation as a 
means for knowing. When elementary school students were asked to explain how they could become more 
certain about what happened in a historical event or about the cause of frog deformities, for which there are 
contradictory accounts, most students reported that eyewitness accounts (e.g. talk to anyone who was around 
at that time) would be sufficient to provide an explanation. Only a few elementary school students reported 
that investigation and interpretation of evidence can provide insights to what happened or what is the cause 
of the problem, respectively (Iordanou, 2016; Kuhn, Iordanou, Pease & Wirkala, 2008). 
The understanding that evidence supports claims has its roots in early childhood – even young 
children draw on evidence from their personal experience to support or contradict claims (Kӧymen, 
Rosenbaum & Tomasello, 2014; Wildenger, Hofer & Burr, 2010). Yet, this understanding is not fully 
developed even by adulthood. Research in the area of argumentation shows that the epistemic understanding 
that evidence can be employed to offer support to theories precedes the development of the understanding 
that evidence also plays the important role of weakening claims (Iordanou & Constantinou, 2014, 2015; 
Kuhn, Zillmer, Crowell, & Zavala, 2013). The understanding that evidence can be used to weaken claims is 
related to understanding that evidence can have different interpretations and that evidence can have different 
functions in relation to different claims.  
2.3. Epistemic beliefs about standards vs. application of epistemic standards 
Examining the development of epistemic cognition reveals two paradoxes. The first is the commonly 
encountered one of a discrepancy between beliefs and their expression in action. In other words, there 
appears to be a discrepancy between individuals’ beliefs regarding epistemic standards and the application of 
epistemic standards in practice. For example, although children might show to endorse the epistemic belief 
that experts in a domain are more reliable than non-experts, as seen in their preference between experts when 
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there are clear differences between them concerning the degree of their prior knowledge, children generally 
adopt in non-problematic fashion, during epistemic action, information from experts in different knowledge 
domains (Harris & Koening, 2006). Elementary school students appear to adopt the epistemic belief, when 
asked, that the epistemic standard of model fit with evidence is useful to evaluate scientific models (Pluta, 
Chinn, & Duncan, 2011), nonetheless, there is evidence that they do not employ this epistemic standard in 
action (Iordanou, Muis, & Kendeou, 2014; Sandoval et al., 2014). In ToM tasks, when judging others’ 
mental states, adults underestimated the probability that a more ignorant other would search incorrectly as a 
result of holding a false belief, even though they were aware of the difference between their own and the 
other’s perspective (Zhang et al., 2010; Birch & Bloom, 2007). In addition, in tasks entailing evaluation of 
texts, Stømsø, Bråten and Britt (2011) found that, although some undergraduate students reported that they 
endorse the epistemic belief of justification of knowledge based on evidence, when asked to indicate the 
criteria on which they have based their judgments of trustworthiness in epistemic action, they reported both 
advanced criteria – content – but also less advanced ones – their own opinion. Similarly, Iordanou, Muis, and 
Kendeou (2014) reported a discrepancy between adolescents’ and adults’ epistemic knowledge and their 
epistemic activity in action. In that study, although some individuals acknowledged that they endorse the 
epistemic belief that evaluation and interpretation of evidence is central for knowing, when directly asked 
how they could become more certain about their knowledge, they did not engage spontaneously in evaluation 
of evidence during epistemic action, when they were reading a text. Focusing on a particular age, we also 
observe lack of consistency in the application of epistemic standards. For example, pre-schoolers do not 
show consistency in using the epistemic standard of an informant’s history of errors, including the number 
and kind of errors made when choosing informants (Mills, 2013); neither do they show consistency in 
assigning test questions correctly to different experts (Aguiar, Stoess & Talyor, 2012). In the examples 
presented above an inconsistency between individual’s epistemic beliefs about standards and the application 
of those epistemic standards has been observed, as well as an inconsistency in the application of epistemic 
standards. Individuals’ epistemic action is not always consistent with their epistemic beliefs.  
The second paradox appears in examining epistemic activity across the lifespan. Although very 
young children show competence with respect to a particular epistemic criterion, older individuals exhibit 
limitations in the application of the same criterion. For example, even though some research findings show 
that pre-schoolers are able to judge an informant’s credibility based on the quality of the informant’s 
argument rather than on his or her power (Castelain, Bernard, Van der Henst, & Mercier, 2015), other 
findings show that most undergraduate students do not engage in evaluation of arguments, examining, for 
example, whether scientific evidence supports a knowledge claim while researching information on the web 
(Mason, Boldrin, & Ariasi, 2010) or when reading a text (Iordanou, Muis, & Kendeou, 2014). 
It is proposed here that the mechanism behind development of epistemic cognition, which explains 
the two paradoxes described above, is the development of individuals’ epistemic awareness of their 
epistemic beliefs and conscious control of application of epistemic standards, an issue that we discuss below.  
2.4. Understanding of epistemic standards and control of their application develop and support 
epistemic cognition in action 
Studying students engaging in dialogic argumentation over time offers insights regarding how both 
knowledge and epistemic cognition change. Iordanou and Constantinou (2015), employing the micro-genetic 
method, a powerful method for understanding epistemic cognitive development (Sandoval, 2014), examined 
how students use evidence to influence the beliefs of their peers. Eleventh graders, working with a partner, 
engaged in electronic argumentative dialogues with classmates who held an opposing view on the topic and 
in some evidence-focused reflective activities, based on transcriptions of their dialogues. Another sixteen 
11th graders, who studied the data base in the learning environment for the same amount of time as 
experimental-condition students but did not engage in an argumentative discourse activity, served as a 
comparison condition. The findings of this study were consistent with findings of other studies (Iordanou & 
Constantinou, 2014; Kuhn & Moore, 2015) in showing that after extensive engagement in argumentative 
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activities, students exhibited a shift from presenting their “right”, self-evident theories of how things are, 
without providing any data to support their argument beyond presenting their personal opinions, to 
employing data to support their positions and offering alternative interpretations for a particular piece of 
evidence.  In addition, students developed an appreciation of the epistemic understanding that evidence can 
be used to weaken others’ claims, which appears to be a more challenging developmental achievement than 
understanding that evidence can be used to support one’s own claims. Finally, students made more specific 
reference to evidence and its source after sustained engagement in argumentative activities, a finding which 
is also consistent with other studies (Iordanou & Constantinou, 2014), suggesting that the process of 
coordinating evidence with claims, and the awareness of the need to do so, came under increasing conscious 
control over time. The analysis of participants’ dialogues over the course of the intervention provided further 
support to this suggestion. In particular, the micro-genetic analysis showed that, in addition to the increase 
observed in the use of evidence and the function of evidence employed, an increase was observed in 
students’ meta-level statements regarding evidence (e.g., ‘‘Give us some evidence’’, ‘‘You have not 
provided evidence’’) over the course of the intervention, revealing a developing epistemological 
understanding of the epistemic standard of evaluating a theory based on its fit to evidence.  
Similar results were observed in Chinn, Duschl, Duncan, Buckland, and Pluta’s (2008) study, where 
middle school students engaged in argumentation and reflective activities aimed at constructing, revising, 
and evaluating scientific models on the basis of evidence, over the course of an academic year. By the end of 
the intervention, students in the experimental condition exhibited greater advances not only in their ability to 
effectively coordinate models and evidence, but also in their understanding of epistemic criteria. A shift was 
observed from non-evidential criteria (e.g., have words and pictures) to evidential criteria, linking models to 
evidence. 
The findings of Iordanou and Constantinou (2015) and Chinn et al.’s (2008) studies have two 
important implications. The first implication is that dialogic argumentation can offer a suitable setting for 
studying students’ epistemic activity in action and gaining a better understanding of how epistemic cognition 
changes. The second implication is that argumentation appears to be a promising pathway to support the 
development of epistemic cognition (Iordanou, 2016; Iordanou, Kendeou, & Beker, 2016; Sandoval, 2005). 
Engagement in argumentation is a fruitful way for making tacit epistemic beliefs, reflected first in epistemic 
action, explicit, as well as for changing epistemic beliefs (Iordanou, 2016). The work of Iordanou (2016) 
showed that engagement in dialogic argumentative activities supported the development of more evaluativist 
epistemic beliefs, that is an understanding that knowledge evolves through coordination of theory with data 
and through evaluation, the position found to be best supported by argument and evidence would be 
determined to have more merit compared to alternative positions (Kuhn et al., 2000). 
The increasing acquisition of awareness and conscious control of application of epistemic standards 
proposed here, and reflected in the Iordanou and Constantinou’s (2015) findings as well as in findings from 
studies on testimony and ToM (Corriveau & Harris, 2009; Koenig & Jaswal, 2011; Mills, 2013; Sobel & 
Corriveau, 2010), are in line with other findings in cognitive development showing a developing 
metacognitive monitoring from childhood to adolescence (Kitsantas & Zimmerman, 2002; Roderer & 
Roebers, 2014; van der Stel & Veenman, 2010). ToM research examining adults’ eye movements, while they 
were following a director’s instructions for moving items, shows that adults initially interpreted the 
director’s instructions egocentrically, just like children, but were faster and more effective in correcting a 
wrong interpretation (Epley, Morewedge & Keysar, 2004). Findings like this one suggest that adults’ better 
metacognitive control is what enables them to “correct” their egocentric errors and exhibit superior 
behaviour than do children (Apperly, Warren, Andrews, Grant, & Todd, 2011). 
2.5. Specificity of epistemic standards 
There is ample evidence pointing to the domain-specificity of epistemic cognition (Muis, Bendixen, 
& Haerle, 2006). Individuals’ epistemic cognition differs across domains (Kuhn et al., 2000) and 
advancement in epistemic cognition in one domain does not necessarily transfer in other domains (Iordanou, 
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2010; 2016; Hofer, 2004). In Iordanou’s (2016) study, notable differences were observed in the epistemic 
standards employed between a social science topic and a physical science topic. When elementary school 
students were asked to justify their knowledge of a physical science topic – dinosaurs’ extinction – and a 
social science topic – home-schooling −, the majority of the students reported scientific evidence to justify 
their knowledge in the physical science topic, while they employed claims from general knowledge or 
personal experience (e.g. “you don’t have friends at home”) to justify their knowledge in the social science 
topic. Domain differences were also observed in both participants’ epistemic beliefs and epistemic activity in 
action between different knowledge domains in Iordanou et al.’s (2014) study. Young adolescents and adults 
in that study engaged in more epistemic processing of evidence in the history domain than in the science 
domain. In particular, they engaged more in judging an evidence’s credibility while reading a text in the 
history domain, than in the science domain. Behind this domain-specificity of epistemic cognition, reside 
domain-specific challenges regarding the development of epistemic cognition. Kuhn et al. (2008) have 
suggested that in the social domain the major challenge in achieving sophisticated epistemic cognition is 
different from the challenge in the science domain.  In a word, in the social domain, the challenge is to come 
to terms with the concern that human interpretation plays an unmanageable, overpowering role, while in the 
science domain, the major challenge is to recognize that human interpretation plays any role at all. In the 
science domain, the entry of human interpretation into what was previously regarded as direct perception of 
a single reality must be recognized and come to be understood in positive terms. Human construction of 
alternative possibilities (multiple representations of truth, or theories) needs to be coordinated with empirical 
evidence, in an ongoing process that constitutes scientific work. In the social domain, in contrast, human 
interpretation is more readily recognized and the danger is one of a permanent stall in a radical relativism, 
with the evil of subjectivity seen as overpowering the quest for any knowledge beyond subjective opinion.  
Epistemic standards also must be examined as a function of context. Students’ epistemic standards 
differ when reflected in essays versus dialogues. In the Kuhn and Moore (2015) study, middle-school 
students used more evidence from their own personal knowledge and experience in their dialogues, about 
90%, than in their essays, 40%, suggesting the dialogue was a more authentic experience for them. 
Finally, specific content also introduces variation in standards. Here, more research is needed. 
Bråten, Strømsø, and Salmerón, (2011) found that readers with low topic knowledge failed to employ the 
most appropriate epistemic standards, whereas Bromme and Thomm (2015) found that adults’ judgments 
regarding reliable informants were not related to participants’ prior knowledge, general science knowledge 
or their study subject. Similarly, Mason, Boldrin and Ariasi (2010) found that prior knowledge was not 
related to epistemic activity in action, whereas Iordanou, Muis, and Kendeou (2014) found that individuals’ 
prior knowledge predicted their epistemic cognition in action. 
 
3. Conclusions and future research 
The question of how knowledge changes as individuals progress through the lifespan requires better 
answers. Research findings point to differences between children and adults in the way they make 
judgments. For example, Tenney, Small, Kondrad, Jaswal, and Spellman (2011) found that adults take into 
consideration information regarding informants’ calibration, that is how well one’s confidence matches one’s 
likelihood of being correct, whereas children ignore this information and tend to rely more on an informant’s 
confidence. The review presented here proposes that epistemic understanding of theory-evidence 
coordination develops gradually and different forms of understanding develop at different ages. Also, the 
present paper presents evidence showing that there is a discrepancy between epistemic beliefs and their 
expression in action. With age and expertise understanding of epistemic standards and control of their 
application develop and support epistemic cognition in action.  There is a need for more developmental 
research, especially longitudinal studies, to enhance our understanding of the forms that epistemic cognitive 
development take and to explain why epistemic development occur or fail to occur.  
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To satisfy the quest for a better understanding of epistemic cognitive development, there is a need 
for new measures that would allow us to examine more deeply and thoroughly what develops (Chinn et al., 
2011). Dynamic instruments that examine individuals’ epistemic cognition as a dynamic, complex construct 
need to be employed. Some promising measures are think-aloud protocols (Hofer, 2004), eye-tracking 
techniques, collaborative discussions and computer-based learning environments (Greene, Muis, & Pieschl, 
2010), all of them employed in micro-genetic investigations. 
There is also need for a better understanding of the specificity of epistemic cognition. Research 
suggests that epistemic cognition has both general and context-specific elements (Muis, Bendixen, & Haerle, 
2006; Sinatra, Kienhues, & Hofer, 2014). Some aspects of epistemic cognition, such as the appreciation of 
evidence, transfer across contexts (Iordanou & Constantinou, 2014; 2015), whereas other aspects, such as the 
epistemic criteria that individuals employ for adopting and revising claims appear to be domain specific 
(Iordanou, 2016; Kuhn et al., 2008). Taking into account the complex and multifaceted nature of epistemic 
cognition, future research needs to examine the specificity question of epistemic cognition at a more fine-
grained level, addressing questions such as how epistemic standards vary across conditions and why this is 
the case.  
Finally, there is a need for future research to examine how the development of epistemic cognition in 
action can be supported. Engagement in dialogic argumentation appears a promising pathway of supporting 
understanding that there is no single self-evident truth and that multiple interpretations may exist of the same 
phenomenon as the human mind plays an active role in ascribing meaning to the world (Carpendale & 
Lewis, 2006; Iordanou & Constantinou, 2015; Moshman, 2004; Walker, Wartenberg, & Winner, 2012). 
Engagement also in explicit reflection about the role of evidence in reasoning and about epistemic standards 
are promising means for supporting an appreciation of the role of evidence in forming and revising 
knowledge (Chinn & Buckland, 2012; Iordanou & Constantinou 2014; 2015). Future research should 
examine such methods further.   
In summary, the purpose of the present paper has been to draw a strong continuous link between the 
earliest understanding of other minds and the tasks that confront adults throughout the life span – that of 
interpreting evidence and coordinating it with what they already take to be true, in a manner over which they 
exercise conscious control. Adults continue to do so imperfectly to be sure (Kuhn, 2016) but their skill has 
developed from earlier levels and has the potential to continue to develop. I propose that epistemic cognition 
builds on increasing awareness and epistemic understanding of theory-evidence coordination and of the role 
of the human mind in interpreting reality. The standards for knowledge formation and revision are closely 
connected with epistemic understanding of theory-evidence coordination and change across the lifespan, as 
well as control of their application. Competence in understanding theory-evidence coordination and the role 
of the human mind in knowing has its roots in early ToM achievements and proceeds gradually from there 
towards more and more mature and complete understanding, in a process that ideally never ends. Future 
research should go beyond a focus on what people believe and increase attention not only on how people 
choose what to believe, but on how these standards for choice themselves evolve and are applied within real-
life contexts. Lastly, addressing the question of how researchers and educators can best support individuals’ 
development in these respects promises to have profound consequences for people’s lives. 
Keypoints 
 The How question of knowledge change is examined 
 Evidence from ToM and evidence theory coordination literature are examined 
 A focus on epistemic activity in action is proposed 
 The standards for knowledge formation and revision change developmentally 
 The process increasingly comes under conscious control 
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